The Unknown CIA; My Three Decades with the Agency

Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc, 1989. First Printing [Stated]. Hardcover. Very good/Very good (). x, 221, [1] pages. Slight creasing to bottom edge of dust jacket. Foreword by Richard Helms. Inscribed by the author on title page. Inscription reads "For Genia and David, Fellow-Spooks. Russell Jack Smith." DJ has slight wear and soiling. The author rose to become Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. Derived from a Kirkus review: CIA business, Smith suggests, is conducted by dedicated intelligence analysts. Smith, himself one such desk man, was present at the creation of the CIA in 1947 (after a stint as an English professor at Williams College). He quickly went on to work at the higher levels of the CIA through such crises as the U-2 fiasco, the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War in the Mideast, and the Vietnam War. He portrays the workaday operations and the internal atmosphere of the agency. Smith has kind words for his directors (Walter Bedell Smith: "a man of genuine brilliance, great personal force, and organizational genius"; Richard Helms, whose "leadership enabled the CIA to become a unified, cohesive organization"). A solid, fascinatingly inside-look. Reflecting on his career long after he retired, Smith was asked which job was most satisfying. He responded immediately, "I must say, I enjoyed it all." With the beginning of U.S. involvement in World War II, Smith signed on with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)-the predecessor of today's CIA. The creation of the Central Intelligence Agency followed, as ordered by the National Security Act. From 1957 to 1962, Smith served on the Board of National Estimates, which was responsible for preparing estimates of foreign intentions. In the early 1960s, then-Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) Ray Cline made Smith the director of Current Intelligence and then his deputy. Smith served as DDI from 1966 to 1971, a period that included the Arab-Israel Six-Day and Vietnam wars. When Smith retired in late 1973, colleagues described him as one of the best all-round substantive analysts in the Intelligence Community. He received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal for a career of significant contributions to the Agency and the analytic profession. His greatest contribution was his memoir, The Unknown CIA. Many historians agree that it is the best reflection on and explanation of a career in intelligence analysis. Derived from a Kirkus review: Unabashedly patriotic memoirs from Smith, former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA. CIA business, Smith suggests, is not transacted by a Blackford Oakes sort of operative or via John le Carre's-style novelistic twists. Rather, it is conducted by dedicated intelligence analysts--"men and women sitting at desks sorting, sifting, and patterning secret evidence into a matrix" that carries conviction. Smith, himself one such desk man, was present at the creation of the CIA in 1947. He quickly went on to work at the higher levels of the CIA through such crises as the U-2 fiasco, the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War in the Mideast, the Vietnam War, and the sinking of the CIA's reputation in the mid-1970's. But in portraying the workaday operations and the internal atmosphere of the agency, Smith manages to restore some of its luster, Recapping the more damning public perceptions, he opines that the "CIA is not like that. Nor, I might add, is the KGB." In fact, he states, "anyone who entertains seriously the notion that CIA could assassinate a leader or topple a foreign government contrary to White House order or permission simply does not understand how power is disposed in Washington." In the meantime, Smith has kind words for his directors (Walter Bedell Smith: "a man of genuine brilliance, great personal force, and organizational genius"; Richard Helms, whose "leadership enabled the CIA to become a unified, cohesive organization"). Surprisingly, Smith points an accusing finger at Nixon, whose "mean-spirited, trust-no.one-but-ourselves, us-against-them siege mentality" precipitated the public denigration of the CIA. A solid, fascinatingly inside-look.