SETUP; What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1993. Presumed First Edition, later (1993) printing. Wraps. Good. xx, 308 pages. Notes. Maps. Includes 35 black and white illustrations. Some yellow highlighting noted. Includes Disclaimer, Foreword, About the Author, and Preface. Topics covered include In the Time of Atomic Plenty; Situations of a Lesser Magnitude; Rolling Thunder and the Diffusion of Heat; "However Frustrated We Are"; "It was a Loser"; Completing the Setup;' and Index. Earl H. Tilford is a military historian and fellow for the Middle East & terrorism. Dr. Tilford retired from the Air Force in 1989 after a career that included tours as an intelligence officer in Thailand and at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command. Dr. Tilford, the author of this book, is not squeamish about demolishing the myths that abound concerning the air war in southeast Asia. He is forthright in challenging both the USAF's strategic tunnel vision and the cherished misconceptions of many civilian historians whose criticisms of the air war in Vietnam are long on politics and short on facts. The integrity of Dr. Tilford's research, his knowledge of air power theory and technology, and his expertise as a historian all contribute to a high quality effort that proves, among other things, that neither the Air Force nor its civilian critics have yet secured a monopoly on truth. In terms of resources allocated, the Vietnam War was primarily an air war. Approximately half the $200 billion spent on the war supported aerial operations; 8 million tons of bombs fell and over 8,500 aircraft were lost between 1961 and 1975. For all that, while air power was occasionally pivotal, it was never decisive, and America's defeat in Vietnam can be construed as a defeat for air power. The failure of air power resulted from deficiencies inherent in doctrine and weaknesses in leadership. For a variety of reasons, the Air Force, which dropped over 6 million tons of bombs, has not faced up to the implications of its defeat.