The River and the Gauntlet; Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces, November, 1950

New York: Time Incorporated, 1962. Special Edition. Trade paperback. Fair. 373, [3] pages. Wraps. Illustrations. Maps. Glossary. Index. Front cover separated and taped back to spine. Covers soiled. Time Reading Program Special Edition. Study of the Korean War battle of the Chongchon River. The Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, also known as the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, was a decisive battle in the Korean War, and it took place from November 25 to December 2, 1950, along the Ch'ongch'on River Valley in the northwestern part of North Korea. In response to the successful Chinese First Phase Campaign against the United Nations (UN) forces, General Douglas MacArthur launched the Home-by-Christmas Offensive to expel the Chinese forces from Korea and to end the war. Anticipating this reaction, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) Commander Peng Dehuai planned a counteroffensive, dubbed the "Second Phase Campaign", against the advancing UN forces. (cont.) Hoping to repeat the success of the earlier First Phase Campaign, the PVA 13th Army first launched a series of surprise attacks along the Ch'ongch'on River Valley on the night of November 25, 1950 at the western half of the Second Phase Campaign, effectively destroying the Eighth United States Army's right flank while allowing PVA forces to move rapidly into UN rear areas. In the subsequent battles and withdrawals during the period of November 26 to December 2, 1950, although the US Eighth Army managed to avoid being surrounded by PVA forces, the PVA 13th Army were still able to inflict heavy losses onto the retreating UN forces which had lost all cohesion. In the aftermath of the battle, the US Eighth Army's heavy losses forced all UN forces to retreat from North Korea to the 38th Parallel. Derived from a Kirkus review: This is true drama, true tragedy to be sure, in as absorbing a record of defeat and heroism as modern war has given us. Brigadier General Marshall was Infantry Operations Analyst with the 8th Army in Korea at the time of the Chinese attack. He has set down this record, in minute and personal detail because he feels that in studying the reasons why our forces were deceived and how they reacted to the situation, lessons are to be drawn. The pre-invasion handicaps, the inadequacies of intelligence, the failure to use procedures perfected in World War II (due to breakneck demobilization largely), the lack of maps -- all these were factors. He examines the oriental pattern of deception and its significance, too little understood. And then he goes on to tell the story of one day, comparable percentagewise to the decimation and disaster of the grim winter at Valley Forge. It is a story of men against defeat, superbly told, with no minimizing of the inadequacies as well as the achievements.