Essays and Dissertations on Various Subjects, Relating to Human Life and Happiness

London: Printed for E. and C. Dilly in the oultry, 1771. 2 volumes. 12mo, 176 x 100 mms., pp. viii, 284; [ii], 379 [380 adverts for Bethune's A Short View of the Human Faculties and Passions]. BOUND WITH: [BETHUNE (John)]: A Short View of the Human Faculties and Passions. With Remarks and Directions respecting thier Nature, Improvements, and Governments. Second Edition. Edinburgh: Printed for A. Neill and sold by A. Kincaid and J. Bell; and E. and C. Dillys, London. 1770], 3 volumes bound in 21, with the Short View bound as a second item in volume 1. Newly rebound in period style quarter calf, gilt spine, red morocco labels, marbled boards. A fine set. John Bethune (1725 - 1774) studied with David Verner at Marischal College and later at the universities of St. Andrews and Edinburgh (probably). These are his two most important works. The entry in The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century British Philosophers (1999) notes, "Following the example set by other philosophers who had adapted Locke's epistemology to their own purposes, Bethune published an ingenious synoptic guide to philosophy, A Short View of the Human Faculties and Passions (1770; 2nd ed.). This is both a descriptive and prescriptive guide, with his concept of the mind - `always to be considered as one simple indivisible principle' - leading the way. Mental powers can be examined separately and analytically, but they are not to be considered `distinct Agents in the mind' but examples of the mind operating or functioning in various different ways. In his Essays and Dissertations on Various Subjects (1771), he addresses himself to a number of the problems and issues raised by Hume's writings, but he denies Hume any merit as a `Theologician' [sic] or as a philosopher. Should Hume's doctrines be given their `full effect' it would mean `the end of all religion and morality.' The most philosophically interesting of these essays of these essays is the one on conscience, which he defines as a `reflex principle within us necessarily or involuntarily determining us to approve of some of our actions and affections as good, and disapprove of the contrary as evil, in a moral and religious sense,' but he gives no guidelines as to how the mind, in an act of consciousness reflecting on its `own ideas or operations,' makes a distinction between something acting or happening necessarily and something acting or happening involuntarily. He is not convinced that the mind is a tabula rasa, saying in his essay on experience that something more is necessary for our improvement as human beings `than the exercise of our sensible or bodily powers.' This, he claims, is obvious; otherwise `inferior and irrational animals' could excel us because they have more acute and lively bodily powers. Bethune attempts, without success, to conflate epistemology and moral theory, suggesting that the mind's exercise of its mental powers in moral situations will lead to good actions, the goodness of which may `be said to consist in their rectitude.' This is a word that does not often appear in eighteenth-century discourses about moral theory, except in a religious or theological context; but Bethune, despite the Christian context in which he wishes to position philosophy, uses the term here in as secular a manner as possible. His other essays are on time, liberty, teaching, education, providence, happiness, desire, death, and immortality. In these, he reveals a good acquaintance with the contemporary and classical literature on the subjects, and while there is nothing startling innovative or cogent in them, the essays can surprise and please by an unexpected combination of ideas." Copies of Bethune's works are uncommon and are seldom found. For the Essays ESTC records copies of this edition in BL, NLS (2), and Glasgow; and for the Short View ESTC find several copies in these islands and National Library of Medicine, Library of Congres , Arizona, Chicago, and Yale in the United States.