Defence of the West; Some Riddles of War and Peace

London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1950. First Printing. Hardcover. Good/Fair. Format is 5 inches by 7.5 inches. viii, [2], 390 pages. Index, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (31 October 1895 - 29 January 1970), commonly known throughout most of his career as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, was a British soldier, military historian and military theorist. In the 1920s and later he wrote a series of military histories that proved influential among strategists. He argued that frontal assault was a strategy that was bound to fail at great cost in lives, as happened in the First World War. He instead recommended the "indirect approach" and reliance on fast-moving armored formations. In his writings on mechanized warfare, Liddell Hart had proposed that infantry be carried along with the fast-moving armored formations. He described them as "tank marines" like the soldiers the Royal Navy carried with their ships. He proposed they be carried along in their own tracked vehicles and dismount to help take better-defended positions that otherwise would hold up the armored units. That contrasted with J.F.C. Fuller's ideas which put heavy emphasis on massed armored formations. Liddell Hart foresaw the need for a combined arms force with mobile infantry and artillery, which was similar but not identical to the make-up of the panzer divisions that Heinz Guderian developed in Germany. In 1954, Liddell Hart published his most influential work, Strategy. The book was largely devoted to a historical study of the indirect approach and in what ways various battles and campaigns could be analyzed using that concept. Still relevant, it was a factor in the development of the British maneuver warfare doctrine. The author deals with some basic problems of the human search for security against aggression. Part I of the book analyzes some of the principal puzzles of World War II. Derived from a Kirkus review: A serious, well-informed military analyst and historian considers the military situation of Western Europe, with appraisals and recommendations for its defense in a war with Russia. The book falls into five parts. Part I deals with blunders of the last war, French military orthodoxy leading up to the 1940 collapse, failure to clean up in Africa in 1941 (much of this based on interviews with German generals), Germany's lack of tank transport in Russia, the policy of unconditional surrender and fostering resistance movements...Part II, titled "Tomorrow", considers the next war, and here the author recommends a minimum land force to check the Russian spearheads, with preponderant effort concentrated on air strength. Part III surveys Russia's forces today, and describes the unused airborne forces as the "ace up Stalin's sleeve". Part IV considers unification, the future of armored forces, conscription, and the Army reorganized for greater flexibility. Finally, Part V reviews such problems as an international police force, disarmament, and limitations of war. There are enough issues addressed to make it of enduring interest to the military strategist and historian.